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Abstract—Conventional fault tolerance techniques either re-
quire big overheads or have limited reliability. We propose a novel
fault tolerant ﬂip-ﬂop (SETTOFF) that addresses timing errors
and soft errors in one cost-efﬁcient architecture. In SETTOFF,
most SEUs are detected by monitoring the illegal transitions at
the output of a ﬂip-ﬂop and recovered by inverting the cell
state. SETs, timing errors and the other SEUs are detected
by a time redundancy-based architecture. For a 10% activity
rate, SETTOFF consumes 35.8% and 39.7% more power than
a library ﬂip-ﬂop in 120nm and 65nm technologies, respectively.
It only consumes about 5.7% more power than the detection
based RazorII ﬂip-ﬂop [1]. The result indicates that SETTOFF
is suitable for building high reliable systems at lower cost than
the traditional techniques.
Index Terms—Fault tolerance, single-event upset, single-event
transient, timing error.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shrinking feature sizes, increasing operating frequency and
supply voltage scaling have signiﬁcantly reduced the reliability
of electronic systems. Soft errors induced by high-energy
particle strikes (such as cosmic neutron [2] and alpha particle
strikes [3]) have become a concern for system reliability even
at ground level. When struck, a sensitive node may produce a
transient current pulse. If a struck node belongs to a storage
cell, the pulse may reverse the cell state, resulting in a typical
soft error: a single-event upset (SEU). When the node belongs
to a logic gate, the transient current pulse may create a single-
event transient (SET). An SET can turn into a soft error if it
propagates and is sampled by a sequential element.
Error Correction Codes (ECC) are a traditional soft error
tolerance technique [4]. Calculating and reading the ECC
bits during each operation induces performance and power
overheads. This overhead can be big in blocks that are
frequently accessed, such as the register ﬁle in a processor.
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is another conventional
technique [5], but the overhead (more than 300% area and
power) is too great for consumer electronics. Other techniques
such as parity coding and duplication only detect and therefore
need to be combined with recovery schemes [6].
Another effective way to combat soft errors is to use
hardened storage circuits, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. Although
these approaches are more cost-efﬁcient than the traditional
TMR-latch [12], they have various drawbacks [7]. A time
redundancy-based, cost-efﬁcient, hardened architecture, Razor,
was proposed for timing faults in a DVS system [13]. Razor
cannot address soft errors. RazorII introduced a new latch that
can detect both soft errors and timing errors [1]. However it
is a latch-based storage cell and does not have any correction
functionality. The combined recovery scheme in RazorII is
again only suitable for recovering timing errors.
In this paper, we introduce a novel Soft Error and Timing er-
ror TOlerant Flip-Flop (SETTOFF) for the three types of errors
(SETs, SEUs and timing errors). SETTOFF takes advantage
of a Time Redundancy-based Detection technique (TRD) to
detect SEUs occurring during an interval, and the SETs and
timing errors occurring in the preceding logic blocks. SEUs
occurring outside the TRD detection interval are interpreted
as illegal transitions and are detected by a transition monitor,
which then generates a signal to recover these SEUs on the
ﬂy by inverting the state of the ﬂip-ﬂop again. Since the errors
detected by TRD are those occurring in the write operation of
the ﬂip-ﬂop, they can be easily recovered by using a low-cost
replay recovery mechanism. The simulation results show that
for a 10% activity rate, SETTOFF consumes 35.8% and 39.7%
more power than a conventional ﬂip-ﬂop in 120nm and 65nm
technologies, respectively. It also requires 48 extra transistors.
Although the overhead is bigger than that of RazorII ﬂip-
ﬂop (28.5% power overhead and 31 extra transistors) [1],
SETTOFF gives a better fault tolerance capability and is
suitable for using in both timing- and safety-critical ﬂip-
ﬂops and systems. Moreover, it also overcomes most of the
drawbacks in the previous hardened storage architectures.
This paper is organized as follows, the next section describes
the background to this work. In section III, we describe the
design of SETTOFF. The veriﬁcation results and analysis are
discussed in section IV and we conclude in section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK
A. Previous Published Hardened Storage Cells
Some fault-tolerant storage circuits have been published
previously [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. The main drawback of these
circuits is that they can only tolerate the SEUs inside the
latch other than the sampled errors which originate in the
preceding logic blocks. Moreover, some architectures, [8] [9],
are susceptible to particles with high energy [7], while others,
[10] [11], cannot protect all the internal nodes of a latch [7].
Another approach called FERST, [7], can mitigate both SETs












Fig. 1. Time redundancy based fault tolerant ﬂip-ﬂop [14].
B. Time Redundancy-Based Error Detection Technique (TRD)
Because SETs occurring in the logic blocks only manifest
themselves for a limited period of time, and will be recovered
automatically, Time Redundancy-based error Detection (TRD)
moves hardware duplication into the time-domain [14] [15].
The technique is conceptually shown in Fig. 1. Dcomp is the
delay of the comparator. With no hardware duplication, TRD
can detect SETs that are manifest on the input of the ﬂip-ﬂop
with the maximum pulse width of Dtr   Dsetup (Dsetup
is the setup time of the latch). Such SETs, if captured by the
main ﬂip-ﬂop at t0, will recover at t0+ Dsetup while the
comparator will assert the error signal due to inconsistent input
values. This architecture can also detect SEUs in the main ﬂip-
ﬂop during t0 to t0+. Although TRD is cost-efﬁcient, it has
no correction ability. Moreover, the SEUs occurring in the
main ﬂip-ﬂop after t0+ will escape detection. Unlike SETs,
SEUs cannot be recovered until the ﬂip-ﬂop is overwritten by
the next input value.
Razor uses an enhanced version of the TRD architecture
for combating timing errors with a delay no greater than
   Dsetup [13]. It adds a shadow latch to sample the input
again at t0 +  for the combined recovery mechanism. A
sufﬁcient  is used to prevent the shadow latch from re-
sampling the timing error. However, Razor does not consider
the presence of soft errors which may corrupt the shadow latch.
Thus the combined recovery mechanism may actually corrupt
the system if the shadow latch is affected.
C. RazorII
Fig. 2 illustrates the architecture of the RazorII ﬂip-ﬂop and
its operating principle [1]. The positive-edge sensitive latch is
augmented with a transition detector (TD) which is controlled
by a detection clock (DC) generator. The error detection is
realized by detecting illegal transitions on the internal latch
node N. To prevent valid transitions from being ﬂagged as
errors, DC disables TD within the period of the CLK-to-Q
delay of the latch to allow the latch to capture its correct input
state. An architectural replay recovery signal is generated by
the asserted error signal.
While this architecture addresses both timing errors and
certain soft errors with a small overhead, its SEU recovery
ability limits its reliability. In RazorII, the architectural replay
scheme re-fetches the instruction in the write back (WB) stage
for correcting SEUs in the pipeline registers. Such a replay
operation will re-write all the current data in the pipeline
registers in which the SEUs will be overwritten before they





















Fig. 2. RazorII Flip-Flop and the operation diagram [1].
scheme cannot apply to the registers that store the architectural
state of the processor, such as the register ﬁle (RF). These
registers may not be written in every cycle, but may be
contaminated by SEUs at any time (e.g. in a store cycle much
after a write operation cycle). Hence it is hard to target the
replay point for re-writing the corrupted register before it
contaminates the following logic. The RF is vulnerable to soft
errors, [16], and hence needs to be protected with high priority.
This makes RazorII difﬁcult to use for fault tolerant systems.
Actually, [1], the RazorII ﬂip-ﬂops are only used for pro-
tecting timing-critical pipeline registers; safety-critical storage
cells like RF and caches are protected against soft errors using
ECC, which may induce more overhead. Another limitation is
that the power consumed by the DC generator to provide a
sufﬁcient negative pulse may increase as the clock frequency
increases. Therefore the RazorII ﬂip-ﬂop may have a much
bigger power overhead in processors with higher speed.
III. KEY CONCEPTS OF SETTOFF
In order to develop a low-cost fault-tolerant scheme with
high efﬁciency, we propose a fault tolerant ﬂip-ﬂop, named
SETTOFF. Three novel components of the SETTOFF are:
1) SETTOFF can detect both soft and timing errors. With a
small overhead to the detection architecture, SETTOFF
provides on-the-ﬂy recovery for those SEUs (those oc-
curring from the write operation of the ﬂip-ﬂop) that
are hard to recover by the low-cost architectural replay
technique. Therefore SETTOFF minimizes the recovery
overhead by separating the recovery process into two.
2) SETTOFF can be used in both safety-critical and timing-
critical systems (such as the DVS system). Soft errors
and timing errors may occur simultaneously. Moreover,
SETTOFF completely eliminates the need for using
high-cost TMR or ECC techniques.
3) SETTOFF is a ﬂip-ﬂop based storage cell. It is easier
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Fig. 4. The operation principle of Part I in SETTOFF.
A. Principle of Operation
Fig. 3 illustrates the architecture of SETTOFF. Part 1 is
the TRD architecture. It contains XOR-gate I that compares
the input and output (True Q) of SETTOFF, and the error
ﬂip-ﬂop which is driven by the falling clock edge. The delay
element  = Dpclk   Dxor gateI, where Dpclk is the
period of the positive clock phase. Part 1 is responsible
for detecting three types of error occurring during the write
operation of the main ﬂip-ﬂop. As shown in Fig. 4, SETs on
the output of Logic Stage L1 with a pulse width no greater than
Dpclk Dxor gateI Dsetup will be detected if captured by
the main ﬂip-ﬂop. Timing errors with a delay no more than
Dpclk   Dxor gateI   Dsetup are also detected (Fig. 4).
Moreover, SEUs occurring in the ﬂip-ﬂop during the positive
clock phase will also be detected in Part 1. The error ﬂip-ﬂop
generates a signal for architectural replay discussed in III-C.
Part 2 is responsible for detecting and recovering the SEUs
that occur during the negative clock phase (i.e. out of the
write operation). It comprises a transition detector (TD) at
the output (Q) of the main ﬂip-ﬂop, a detection clock (DC)
generator for TD, and XOR-gate II which propagates or inverts
Q to True Q according to the Error SEU signal. Only those
SEUs that corrupt the output of the main ﬂip-ﬂop need to
be considered; others are masked. Two operation states are
deﬁned in Table I. In normal operation, the DC generator
disables TD during the positive clock phase to avoid legal
transitions being ﬂagged as errors. Q propagates to True Q
TABLE I
THE OPERATION STATE OF PART II IN SETTOFF
State Activities
Normal Operation Propagate Q
(Error SEU=0) Enable TD during negative clock phase
Fault Operation Invert Q
(Error SEU=1) Enable TD during all clock phase
since Error SEU is zero. During the negative clock phase,
TD detects the SEUs that reverse the state of the ﬂip-ﬂop
and asserts the Error SEU signal, which feeds into XOR-gate
II and the DC generator. Therefore if Q is inverted by an
SEU, XOR-gate II and the asserted Error SEU signal will
then invert Q back to the correct state (True Q) at nearly the
same time. Meanwhile, with the asserted Error SEU signal,
the DC generator generates control signals to enable TD during
all clock phases.
The SETTOFF will not return to the normal operation state
until TD is reset by the Error Reset signal, or TD detects the
next transition in Q, which will assign Error SEU back to
zero. To explain this, we assume two circumstances as shown
in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b):
(a) If the next transition is another SEU occurring during
the fault operation, it will reverse the state of the main ﬂip-ﬂop
back to the correct value. Hence TD switches the SETTOFF
to the normal operation state to propagate Q to True Q (Fig.
5(a)). In other words, an even number of SEUs during one
cycle can correct the state of the ﬂip-ﬂop.
(b) If the next transition is caused by the SETTOFF
sampling the next input, the former detected SEU will be
overwritten and the ﬂip-ﬂop will operate normally (Fig. 5(b)).
A third circumstance can happen when the next input does
not reverse the corrupted state of the main ﬂip-ﬂop. In this
case, no transition occurs in Q therefore SETTOFF stays in
the fault operation state which inverts the correct Q to generate
a faulty output True Q. However, the faulty output will not be
read since it will be detected by Part 1 at the following falling
clock edge. A replay signal will then be generated to recover
the faulty output and reset the SETTOFF back to the normal
operation state (Fig. 5(c)). Part 2 guarantees the output of the
SETTOFF will never be corrupted by SEUs occurring in the
negative clock phase; other faults are detected by Part 1.
Finally, Part 2 of SETTOFF is complementarily protected
by Part 1. When a soft error corrupts the output of Part
2 (Error SEU), Part 1 will detect the erroneous output of
SETTOFF (True Q) at the following falling edge of the
clock and invoke the replay process, which prevents the error
from contaminating the following logic. The only susceptible
element in the fault-tolerant circuitry is the error ﬂip-ﬂop in
Part 1. However, in most cases, the erroneous error indication
signal that is generated by the error ﬂip-ﬂop only results in an
unnecessary replay operation. Furthermore, since the error ﬂip-
ﬂop can be easily shared within a system (see III-C), we can
protect it by a conventional mechanism (such as ECC, TMR)
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Fig. 5. The operating principle of Part II in SETTOFF.
B. Transistor Level Design of SETTOFF
The circuit schematic of the transition detector and the
detection clock generator are shown in Fig. 6. The transition
detector (Fig. 6(a)), is developed from the transition detector
proposed for RazorII [1]. It requires two pulse generators
to generate an ‘implicit’ pulse out of a rising and a falling
transition at its input node, respectively. Each pulse generator
requires a delay-chain which is formed by an inverter and a
transmission gate, with an AND gate to generate the pulse. The
pulse is then captured by the dynamic OR gates to switch the
Error SEU signal. Based on the transition detector in RazorII,
another dynamic OR gate that contains two AND gates is
added to the upper side of the circuit. The two control signals,
DCH and DCL are the on/off switches for the circuit on upper
and lower sides, respectively. The two sides work in turn in the
two states shown in Table I. In the normal operation state, the
upper side is switched off; DCL turns on the lower side during
the negative clock phase. In this case, I3 and TG2, which with
the AND gate, d1 and d3, act as the pulse generator for the
rising transition. I2, TG1, d0 and d2 act as the pulse generator
for the falling transition. In the fault operation state, the lower
side is switched off and the upper side is switched on by DCH
during all clock phases. This time I3 and TG2 are the delay
chain for the falling transitions, while I2 and TG1 form the
delay chain for the rising transitions. The operating principle
of DCH and DCL is given in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b). The
Error SEU pin will switch between ‘0’ and ‘1’ in the presence
of multiple transitions at the input of the transition detector.
The Error Reset signal pre-charges node N to set the
Error SEU pin to zero and the circuit to the normal operation
state. It can be generated in a architectural replay process
which is invoked by the error signal in the error latch. The
cross-coupled inverter pairs are used to protect the dynamic
node N from discharging or charging by the leakage current.
In the circuit of the detection clock generator (Fig. 6(b)),
a delay is created by the transmission gate for generating
DCL and DCH signal. This allows sufﬁcient time for thedynamic node N to be charged or discharged when a transition
is captured by the delay chains. The voltage supply for all
the transmission gates in SETTOFF is tunable for controlling
the delay they generate. However, the normal supply voltage
(1.2V) is used when validating the design.
C. Incorporating SETTOFF in a Processor
As mentioned above, a longer positive clock phase in SET-
TOFF () in the TRD architecture can detect SETs with wider
pulse widths and timing errors with longer delays. Hence, the
detection capability of SETTOFF can be tuned by altering the
duty cycle of the clock without affecting the operating speed.
However, this constrains the minimum propagation delay of
the combinational logic, and buffers may need to be inserted,
which induce area and power overheads.
The errors detected by the TRD architecture are easy to
recover with a low-cost architectural replay mechanism. This
is because these errors are detected in the write operation of the
ﬂip-ﬂop. The instruction executing the faulty write operation
can be easily targeted by check-pointing the program counter.
The faulty instruction can be then re-fetched and re-executed
to overwrite the detected errors. Speciﬁcally, the scheme
can be realized by simply amending the replay mechanism
which often already exists in high-performance processors [1].
Moreover, if a detected error is not recovered after a certain
number of replays, we can consider it as an timing error and
adjust the voltage or frequency during the next replay process.
The replay mechanism will be investigated in future work.
The error ﬂip-ﬂop can be shared by multiple SETTOFFs.
Only the upper side OR gate in the TD and two XOR gates are
added compared to the RazorII architecture (the DC generators
of SETTOFF and Razor have different architectures but the
same number of transistors). The area overhead increase is
small. Additionally, the XOR gate added on the output of
the main ﬂip-ﬂop can induce certain performance penalties
as it increases the propagation delay of the main ﬂip-ﬂop.
An alternative way to minimize the performance overhead is
to replace the output inverter inside the main ﬂip-ﬂop by the
correction XOR gate, then use TD to monitor the internal node
rather than the output of the main ﬂip-ﬂop.
IV. VERIFICATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Simulation Results
The SETTOFF was implemented in two technology li-
braries, 65nm and 120nm, for veriﬁcation and evaluation. A
conventional ﬂip-ﬂop is picked from each technology library
for the main ﬂip-ﬂop in SETTOFF. We used Spice to simulate
the circuits. Two independent current sources are added on the
output and input node of the main ﬂop-ﬂop for injecting SEUs,
SETs and timing errors, respectively. SETs with different pulse
widths, timing errors with different delay values, and SEUs
with different appearance time were injected. Several example
simulation waveforms (Fig. 7, Fig. 8) are shown. In Fig. 7, a
SET is injected and is captured by the main ﬂip-ﬂop. The error
signal is asserted on the falling edge of the clock due to the
inconsistent values on the input and output of SETTOFF. Fig.
Fig. 7. The operation diagram when a SET is injected.
Fig. 8. The operation diagram when a SEU is injected.
8 shows an SEU injected during the negative clock phase.
TD detects the illegal transition and asserts the Error SEU
to invert the output of SETTOFF to the correct value. The
circuit is switched back to the normal operation state after the
SEU is overwritten by the next input. The SETTOFF (True Q)
generates two glitches instead of being corrupted by the SEU.
B. Comparative Analysis
We compare SETTOFF with Razor ﬂip-ﬂops in terms of
reliability and fault-tolerance overheads – Table II.
The power consumption overhead of SETTOFF is measured
at an operating frequency of 185MHz and a supply volt-
age of 1.2V. With the 120nm technology library, SETTOFF
consumes 28.4% extra power when data does not switch
on the main ﬂip-ﬂop, and 102.0% extra power when dataTABLE II
COMPARATIVE RESULTS OF THE FAULT TOLERANT OVERHEAD
SETTOFF Razor RazorII
Power Overhead1 35.8% 30.0% 28.5%
(For a 10% Activity Rate)
Area Overhead 48 54 31
(Extra Transistors Required)
switches. Hence for a 10% activity rate, SETTOFF consumes
35.8% more power than a conventional ﬂip-ﬂop. According
to [1], a RazorII ﬂip-ﬂop consumes 28.5% more power than
a conventional ﬂip-ﬂop for the same voltage, frequency and
activity rate in a 130nm technology1, while Razor consumes
30.0% more power. Therefore SETTOFF consumes about
5.7% more power than RazorII, and about 4.5% more power
than Razor. In addition, with the same activity rate, SETTOFF
consumes 39.7% more power (136.0% for non-switching data
and 29.0% for switching data) in the 65nm technology. More-
over, without the need to provide a sufﬁcient negative phase
to cover the CLK-to-Q delay, we can use smaller transistors
for the transmission gate in the DC generator compared to
RazorII. This eliminates the big power overhead that might be
induced by the large transmission gate at a much higher clock
frequency, e.g. 1GHz. 48 extra transistors are added to the
main ﬂip-ﬂop for SETTOFF. The Razor and RazorII ﬂip-ﬂops
require 54 and 31 extra transistors, respectively.
In terms of the reliability, SETTOFF can detect SETs with
pulse widths no bigger than Dpclk Dsetup Dcomp, timing
errors with delay no greater than Dpclk  Dsetup Dcomp,
and all the SEUs during all clock phases. It also provides
an on-the-ﬂy recovery capability for the SEUs occurring
during the negative clock phase. RazorII ﬂip-ﬂop only provides
detection and has a similar detection capability as SETTOFF
for all three types of error. Razor possesses the same timing
error tolerant capability but cannot address soft errors.
In respect to an electronic system, SETTOFF induces a
desirable extra overhead comparing to the Razor ﬂip-ﬂops.
However, it can potentially tolerate the soft errors which may
corrupt Razor ﬂip-ﬂop, and the SEUs occurring out of the
write operation of the storage cell (such as the SEUs occurring
in the store cycle) which may corrupt RazorII ﬂip-ﬂop and the
TRD technique.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a new ﬂip-ﬂop architecture named
SETTOFF, for tolerating both soft errors and timing errors
efﬁciently. Beside the detection ability for SETs, SEUs and
timing errors, we add a moderate overhead to the detection
architecture to provide an on-the-ﬂy circuit-level recovery
capability for SEUs occurring in the write operation of the ﬂip-
ﬂop. A single SETTOFF requires 48 extra transistors and with
a 10% activity rate, it consumes 35.8% and 39.7% more power
than a conventional ﬂip-ﬂop in 120nm and 65nm technology,
respectively. If combined with a low-cost architectural replay
1We consider the difference between 120nm and 130nm to be minor.
mechanism, SETTOFF can reduce the soft error rate of a
system signiﬁcantly by tolerating all the detected errors. It is
applicable for both timing-critical and safety-critical parts in
the system, and completely eliminates the need for traditional
high-cost fault tolerant techniques such as ECC and TMR.
SETTOFF is suitable for mainstream ﬂip-ﬂop based designs
that have either DVS or fault-tolerant requirements. Future
research will focus on implementing a high-performance pro-
cessor with SETTOFF to assess system-level trade-offs.
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